Flexibility and Feminization: The New Ontario Employment Standards Act by Fudge, Judy
Journal of Law and Social Policy
Volume 16 Article 1
2001
Flexibility and Feminization: The New Ontario
Employment Standards Act
Judy Fudge
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Social Policy by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Fudge, Judy. "Flexibility and Feminization: The New Ontario Employment Standards Act." Journal of Law and Social Policy 16. (2001):
1-22.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol16/iss1/1
FLEXIBILITY AND FEMINIZATION: THE NEW
ONTARIO EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ACT
JUDY FUDGE
RtSUMt
On parle souvent de frminisation et de souplesse pour d6crire ce qui se produit sur les
march6s du travail des pays industrialists depuis les ann6es 1980, bien qu'on ne
s'entende pas sur leur signification. En examinant la toute nouvelle Loi sur les normes
d'emploi de l'Ontario, l'auteur tente de d~montrer que la souplesse et la f6minisation
sont deux ph~nom~nes lins ensemble A une diminution de la qualit6 des relations de
travail types. Les changements ainsi apport~s aux normes minimales de la province
en mati~re de travail t~moignent d'une philosophie n6olib6rale sur le plan de la
r~glementation du march6 de l'emploi, notamment par rapport A la question des heures
de travail. Ces modifications refl~tent toutefois une certaine consid6ration des diffi-
cults que pose aux travailleuses la responsabilit6 de s'occuper de leurs enfants et
d'autres membres de la famille. En plus d'expliquer les contradictions qui en r6sultent,
cet article illustre comment la politique du gouvernement ontarien en ce qui concerne
les normes d'emploi aura vraisemblablement pour effet d'accroitre 1'ensemble des
in6galites qui existent sur le march6 du travail et d'aggraver la repartition actuelle du
travail selon le sexe, en plus d'&re inefficace. En refusant de remettre en question ses
postulats de d~part, le gouvernement de l'Ontario agit sur l'6conomie comme une
machine favorable h l'entreprise mais nuisant A l'int6rt public.
Ten years ago, I argued in this Journal that it was time to redesign employment
standards legislation in order both to bring it better into line with changing forms of
employment and to elevate its status as a mechanism for regulating the labour market.'
I identified trends in the Canadian labour market, especially the increase in nonstan-
dard jobs historically associated with women workers and increasing inequality in the
labour market, that were, and continue to be, associated with labour market polices
Judy Fudge teaches employment and labour law at Osgoode Hall Law School, where she has been
a member of the faculty since 1987. She wrote her first brief to the Ontario government on the
Employment Standards Act in 1989 and has not stopped since. She is a member of the Employment
Standards Work Group-a coalition of community legal clinics, unions, workers' advocates, and
social justice organizations that focuses attention on the need for improved labour standards and
better enforcement of employment standards legislation. She would like to thank the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council for the Community University Research Alliance grant to
study contingent work for supporting the research on which this paper was based.
1. Judy Fudge, "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law's Little Sister and the
Feminization of Labour" (1991), 7 J.L. Soc. Pol'y 73.
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designed to promote flexibility. I advocated that a revised employment standards
policy be used to re-regulate the labour market.
The fledging New Democratic government of Ontario did not embark on an ambitious
project to reform the Employment Standards Act. Instead, it followed a more modest
path, injecting a bit more equity into the legislation. The increase in the minimum
wage and the introduction of a wage protection program, which provided some
compensation for employees who were owed statutory entitlements by impecunious
or absconding employers, were the most-far reaching changes to employment stan-
dards brought in by the Rae government. Specific provisions for homeworkers and
building service workers, such as cleaners, alleviated the plight of some of the workers
who were most vulnerable to exploitation. 2 In general, however, the government
maintained the legislative status quo and reductions to the Ministry of Labour staff
meant that there were even fewer resources for enforcement.
Now, ten years later, the Conservative government of Ontario, has just re-written the
Employment Standards Act. During its first mandate, the Harris government froze the
minimum wage, abolished the employee wage protection fund, overhauled the legal
rules relating to enforcement and made further cuts to the number of staff devoted to
enforcing the legislation. 3 However, it held back from changing workers' basic
entitlements under the legislation, even though the Red Tape Commission, which the
government appointed to ferret out and rid the economy of wasteful bureaucratic
regulation, recommended significant changes to employment standards.4
In its 1999 campaign for a second mandate, the Conservative government targeted
employment standards for two types of changes. It promised to increase flexibility in
hours of work, although it was never precise about how this was going to be done, and
to introduce a new unpaid family leave, most of the details of which were in place.
On December 20, 2000, after limited public consultation ahd less legislative review,
Bill 147, a completely re-written Employment Standards Act, was shepherded through
third reading by Minister of Labour Chris Stockwell.5
In this article I want to focus on the two most prominent new features of the revised
Employment Standards Act: the changes to the hours of work and leave provisions.
Bill 147 represents the Ontario government's dual, and I will argue, ultimately
contradictory, labour policy of increasing flexibility in hours of work through dereg-
ulation and accommodating the competing demands of family and employment
through unpaid leave. These policies both exemplify and respond to trends in the
2. See, S.O. 1991 c. 16, s. 5; S.O. 1995, c. 1; 0. Reg. 770/94, s. 1(I).
3. The Employment Standards Improvement Act, 1996 (Bill 49), S.O. 1996, c. 23. The Employee Wage
Protection Fund was discontinued on the day the Public Sector Transition Stability Act, 1997, came into
effect.
4. For the most recent incarnation of the Red Tape Commission see <http://www.redtape. gov.on.ca/
english> (date accessed: 1 March 2001).
5. Bill 147, S.O. 2000, c. 41. The Bill was introduced November 23 and received Royal Assent on
December 21, 2000.
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labour market, which in my 1991 article I identified as flexibility and feminization.
In this article, I argue that the provincial government's preoccupation with promoting
a certain kind of labour market flexibility exacerbates the deterioration in, which I call
the feminization of, terms and conditions of employment. I will also argue that the
type of labour policy exemplified in Bill 147 is inequitable and inefficient.
To make this argument, the article is divided into three sections. The first section places
labour policy in the context of economic restructuring, explains the key concepts-
flexibility and feminization-used to describe changes in labour policy and the labour
market, identifies the key labour market trends of the 1990s, and examines how the
labour market policy debate has been framed. The object of this section is to provide
a framework for analyzing and evaluating the Ontario Conservative government's
employment standards policy. The second section sketches the legislative and policy
context for Bill 147, describing how the Harris government went about reforming the
Employment Standards Act. The heart of the case study is presented in section three,
which provides a detailed analysis and evaluation of the changes to the hours of work
and leave provisions contained in Bill 147. Here, I illustrate how the government's
employment standards policy is likely to increase overall inequality in the labour
market, be inefficient and exacerbate the current unequal sexual division of labour. I
conclude by suggesting directions for reforming employment standards.
I. FLEXIBILITY IN THE CANADIAN LABOUR MARKET: FLEXIBILITY
FOR WHOM?
Since the mid-1970s, the economies of Western industrialized countries, Canada
included, have restructured. The restructuring has been driven by a series of growing
and historical crises in the international division of labour, the shift in economic and
political power further in favour of transnational corporations, in global finance, and
the capacity of the governments to regulate business. 6 To varying degrees, elected
governments have adopted a range of macro-economic policies which are designed to
attract private capital to invest in their economies. These include
" an emphasis on freer trade across national boundaries,
" deficit containment,
" dampening inflation,
" reducing government spending in the social welfare field,
" privatization, and
" deregulation (both implicit and explicit).
6. Isabella Bakker, "Deconstructing Macro-economics through a Feminist Lens," in Janine Brodie, ed.,
Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 31 at 33; Isabella Bakker,
"Introduction: Engendering Macroeconomic Policy Reform in an Era of Global Restructuring and
Adjustment," in I. Bakker, ed., The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (London: Zed
Press, 1994) 1.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
These policies are typically identified as neo-liberal and they are based on the
neo-classical economic model that displaced Keynesianism in the late 1970s to
become conventional economic wisdom. 7 The neo-classical advice is to balance
aggregate supply and demand via flexible prices, interest rates and wages. Since the
mid-1980s, Canadian fiscal and monetary policy has been an exemplar of neo-liber-
alism. During the 1990s, inflation was wrestled to the ground and the federal and most
provincial deficits were almost eliminated. However, the problem remains the endur-
ing high levels of unemployment in Canada.
The solution to this problem is identified as increasing the flexibility of the labour
market. However, "flexibility is a very unclear word if it is not put in perspective and
interests are not specified."'8 If flexibility is defined as the ability to change, then a
flexible labour market would allocate and reallocate labour to different uses at
different times according to the economy's changing demands. According to this
measure, Canada's labour market is flexible when compared with other industrialized
countries; job turnover is high and nonstandard employment has grown.9 But, flexi-
bility can also mean deregulation. The neo-classical economic model assumes that
"left to its own devices, a competitive labour market will indeed ensure that all willing
workers are employed, and that the resulting market-clearing wage will in some
essential sense be a 'fair' one (in that it automatically reflects labour productivity.)"'10
By this yardstick, Canada is, one again, at the flexible pole of the international spectrum."l
Despite this, the neo-classical advice is to increase flexibility by further reducing the
influence of trade unions and the constraints of employment protection laws.
Under the neo-classical model, the terms of flexibility are determined by the needs of
employers not employees. From the demand side, firms increasingly want to rely on
a range of nonstandard forms of employment to respond quickly to prevailing market
conditions or to changes in the production process. They also want to be able to
compete with jurisdictions where the costs of labour are lower and there are fewer
restrictions on how labour is deployed. One effect of neo-classical policies to increase
7. F.R. Wooley, "The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics" (1993) 17 Cambridge J. Eco-
nomics 485.
8. Antonella Picchio, "Wages as a Reflection of Socially Embedded Production and Reproduction
Processes," Linda Clarke, Peter de Gijsel, and Jon Jaussen, eds., The Dynamics of Wage Relations
in the New Europe (London: Kluwer, 1999).
9. Jim Stanford, "Bending over Backwards: Is Canada's Labour Market Really Inflexible?" (1995), 4
Can. Business Economics J. 70 at 71.
10. Jim Stanford, "Discipline, Insecurity and Productivity: The Economics Behind Labour Market 'Flex-
ibility,"' in Jane Pulkingham and Walter Temowetsky, eds., Remaking Social Policy: Striking
Claims and Forging Change (Halifax: Femwood, 1996) 130 at 139.
11. According to the OECD, only the United Kingdom and the United States, where labour market
regulation is virtually non-existent, ranked as more flexible (Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, OECD Employment Outlook 1994 (Paris: OECD, 1994). See also Jim Stan-
ford, "Canadian Labour Market Developments in International Context: Flexibility, Regulation and
Demand," CSLS Conference on Structural Aspects of Unemployment in Canada, Ottawa, April 1999
(on file with the author.)
Flexibility and Feminization
labour market flexibility is that they tend to remove protection primarily from the
weakest groups in an economy rather than exposing all groups to competition. More
generally, the risks of productive activity are shifted from employers, and often the
state, to employees. 12
If flexibility is defined as adaptability to change it does not have to be synonymous
with economic insecurity. 13 Employees also want flexibility, but they want to avoid
the insecurity that is associated with flexibility solely on the employer's terms. From
the supply side, workers need flexibility in order to combine paid employment with
their lifestyle decisions, the most important of which, from a social perspective, is the
decision to care for others, especially children. From this perspective, the policy
challenge is twofold. First, to develop policies that would permit employers to
continue to benefit from flexibility in employment relations, such as hours of work
and contingent and nonstandard forms of employment, for example, but that would
not shift all of the risks of flexibility to workers. The second challenge is to design
policies that accommodate better the dual demands of the labour market and house-
holds without reinforcing a sexual division of labour that results in women performing
a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic labour to their economic disadvantage. 14
Labour Market Trends: Feminization and Inequality
The labour market of the 1980s was characterized by two trends: feminization and
polarization. In the earlier article, I defined feminization as a twofold process: the
increased labour market participation of women and the increase in nonstandard jobs-
jobs that are part-time, temporary, poorly paid and insecure-typically associated with
women. 15 Polarization refers to the increasing inequality in the labour market which is
exacerbating household inequality. These trends continued throughout the 1990s, fuelled
in part by labour market policies designed to promote flexibility through deregulation. 16
12. Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, "Labour Law, Social Security, and Economic Inequality"
(1991), 15 Cambridge J. Economics 125; Ulrich Beck, The Brave New World of Work (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000).
13. Diane Bellemare, "Canadian Government Policies on Flexibility and Job Precariousness," in Gille
Laflamme, Gregor Murray, Jacques Belanger, and Gilles Ferland, eds., Flexibility in Labour Markets
in Canada and the US (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, International Labour
Organization, 1989) 185-206.
14. Roberta Spalter-Roth and Heidi Hartmann, "Gauging the Consequences for Gender Relations, Pay
Equity and the Public Purse," in Kathleen Baker and Kathleen Christensen, eds., Contingent Work.
American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1998) 69; Judy Fudge and Leah
Vosko, "By Whose Standards? Re-regulating the Canadian Labour Market" (2000), 22 Economic
and Industrial Democracy 327-56.
15. Fudge, supra note I at 79; Leah Vosko, Temporary Work." The Gendered Rise of a Precarious
Employment Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000) 34. Women continue to be over-
represented in non-standard work. In 1999, 41 per cent of women versus 29 per cent of men were in
non-standard work; Statistics Canada, Women in Canada 2000: A Gender-based Statistical Report,
Catalogue no. 89-503-XE (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2000) 103.
16. Garnett Picot and Andrew Heisz, "'he Performance of the 1990s: Canadian Labour Market"
Research Paper Series, Analytic Studies Branch 148, Statistics Canada, April 2000.
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Throughout the 1990s, the type of jobs created continued to shift away from full-time,
full-year employment with a single employer on an indefinite basis to nonstandard or
contingent forms of employment. The decline in real earnings of recent labour market
entrants, particularly young men and male immigrants, continued despite the increase
in the human capital (skills and experience) of these workers. The significant improve-
ments in labour market outcomes (earnings and employment) for women were offset
by the general deterioration for men. And although inequality in individual earnings
only increased marginally during the 1990s, among families inequality in market
earnings rose substantially, which from a welfare perspective is likely the more
important measure. Moreover, the unexpected rise in the low-income rate during the
mid-1990s recovery suggests that this is a structural, rather than cyclical, change in
the labour market. 17
There is also a relationship between the growing polarization in wages and recent
trends in overtime; full-time and professional workers are working more overtime,
though largely unpaid, with one employer rather than their low-wage counterparts in
part-time employment or other forms of nonstandard employment, who are more prone
to moonlight than attain overtime in their main job. 18 Overall, the proportion of men
and women putting in long hours have been rising since the early 1980s. Moreover,
to ensure that family living standards do not drop in the face of declining and stagnant
real wage rates, more members of households are in the labour market. 19
The increase in hours of work for a growing proportion of individual employees and
the increasing amount of time spent in the labour market by family members has had
some measurable negative individual and social consequences. Although relatively
little research has been devoted to the health implications of working long hours,
preliminary research has revealed that an increase in working hours is associated with
increased cigarette and alcohol consumption, weight gain and depression.20 Other
studies have shown that time stress is on the increase for every age group of Canadians,
especially those who have the most responsibilities. The "struggle to juggle" in 1998
was most difficult for those aged 25 to 44 who were married parents and employed
full time. Men in this group averaged 48.6 hours and women averaged 38.8 hours per
week of paid work and work-related activities, an increase of 2.0 hours per week since
1992 for both men and women. 21 But, despite the huge increase in women's labour
17. Picot and Heisz, supra note 17; The rise in lone-parent families, together with the fact that mean and
women with similar earnings levels are increasingly marrying one another, meant that family inequality
rose. Vanier Institute of the Family, "The Current State of Canadian Family Finances: 2000 Report,"
(2001) online: <http://www.vifamily.ca/PR/state2O0O/state.htm> (date accessed: 1 March 2001).
18. Doreen Duchesne, "Working Overtime in Today's Labour Market" (1997) Perspectives on Labour
and Income 9; Fudge, supra note 1 at 73; Deborah Sussman, "Moonlighting: A Growing Way of
Life" (1998) Perspectives on Labour and Income 24.
19. Vanier Institute of the Family, supra note 17 at 8.
20. Margot Shields, "Long Working Hours and Health" (2000) Perspectives on Labour and Income 49.
21. That Was the finding of a Statistics Canada General Social Survey: Time Use (November 1999).
Among the findings was that one-third of Canadians aged 25 to 44, representing just over 3 million
people, identified themselves as workaholics in 1998, and more than half worry that they do not have
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market participation since the 1960s, their total share of unpaid work has remained
the same, at about two-thirds of the total. Even when employed full-time, women are
still largely responsible for looking after their homes and families. Levels of severe
time stress are the highest for employed married mothers.22
The Policy Debate: Efficiency or Fairness
Since the early 1980s, the policy debate over employment and labour law reform in
North America has been posed in stark "either/or" terms contrasting equity with
efficiency or opposing regulation and rigidity to deregulation and flexibility. 23 In
conventional economic theory, a wide dispersion of labour market rewards, some of
which may be insufficient to sustain a reasonable standard of life, is assumed to be a
demonstration of how widely dispersed are individual resource endowments and
capabilities. From this perspective, "any idea of social justice designed to reduce
income inequalities risks damaging incentives and lowering overall economic well-
being. '24 This is the basis of the thesis that there exists an inverse trade off between
equity and efficiency.
However, there are alternative perspectives, especially those of institutional and
feminist economists, that focus attention on the external and internal forces structuring
markets and how these shape the incomes and opportunities of individuals. From these
perspectives, equity and efficiency may not be as far apart as the current debate
suggests; in fact, some economists argue that increasing social equality improves
economic efficiency and leads to higher economic growth and well-being. 25
Improving and extending labour standards may, for example, decrease employee
turnover, increase morale and productivity, and reduce occupational injuries. More-
over, the proliferation of low-compensation contingent work also raises the spectre of
slower productivity growth and dynamic inefficiency-the failure of firms to adapt
and innovate. 26 Although conventional neo-classical economic theory posits that low
productivity leads to low compensation, there is a strong argument that the causality
enough time to spend with their family and friends. The Statistics Canada report is available online at
<http://www.statcan.ca:80/Daily/EnglishI991116/d991116a.htm> (date accessed: 1 March 2001).
22. Statistics Canada, supra note 15 at 111. The Globe and Mail reported that, according to the findings
of a recent Statistics Canada study, women work an average of two weeks a year more than men do,
when paid and unpaid work are combined. Colin Freeze, "Women Outwork Men by Two Weeks
Every Year, The Globe and Mail (13 March 2001) Al at 9.
23. Picchio, supra note 8 at 23; Michael Kitson, Ron Martin, and Frank Wilkinson, "Labour Markets,
Social Justice and Economic Efficiency" (2000), 24 Cambridge J. Economics 631.
24. Kitson, Martin, and Wilkinson, supra note 23 at 631.
25. Kitson, Martin, and Wilkinson, supra note 23; Diane Elson, "The Economic, the Political and the
Domestic: Businesses, States and Households in the Organization of Production" (1998) 3 New
Political Economy 189; Pierre Fortin, Andrew Sharpe, and France St-Hilaire, "You Can Be Too
Rich," The Globe and Mail (25 January 2001).
26. S. Herzenberg, J. Alics, and H. Wial, New Rules for a New Economy (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1998)
150; C. Tilly, Half a Job: Bad and Good Part-time Jobs in a Changing Labor Market (Philadelphia:
Temple, 1996) 16; Kitson, Martin, Wilkinson, supra note 23.
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can run in the opposite direction. Paying employees poorly can trigger and perpetuate
a vicious circle for firms in the service sector whereby they attract low skilled and low
commitment workers, driving up turnover, which, in turn, erodes a firm's level of
service. When consumers reduce their demand for the low quality service, the firm
responds by keeping compensation low. As well, access to low cost labour may make
productivity increases unnecessary for employers. 27 Moreover, the neo-classical
assumption that there is a transparent trade-off between the quantity and quality of
jobs has not been borne out by the most recent studies of increases in minimum wages
in the United States. Card and Krueger found that the employment effects of increasing
the minimum wage was zero to positive. This may be due to its effect on aggregate
demand (raising the compensation of the lowest paid workers does destroy their jobs
but the greater purchasing power created by a higher wage floor generates roughly the
same number of better paid jobs) or it may be that low-wage employers mistakenly
set wages too low and enforced increases bring benefits in reduced turnover and
heightened productivity that off-set higher wage costs. 28
Furthermore, whether a particular initiative is efficient or not depends upon the level
at which the outcomes are being measured: "'efficiency' at the level of the firm
(micro-efficiency) is not necessarily synonymous with efficiency of the overall
outcome. '29 Policies that promote equity in the labour market, in particular, may have
an important impact at the macro level in promoting productivity. Shifts of risks and
social costs cannot be confused with a reduction of the social capital, the public
infrastructure, and private labour needed to reproduce a stable working population.3 0
As Irene Breugel and Diane Perrons point out, "[T]here is a disjuncture between what
is rational for some individual enterprises within the pre-existing gender order and
what would collectively benefit employers in their need for a highly productive
workforce. '' 31 The examples they cite are mandatory (and generous) parental leaves
and mid-career breaks, which would allow the retention of skilled employees by all
firms without increasing the marginal costs of a "good" firm relative to a "bad" one.
Not only is there the possibility that, in the absence of mandatory standards, the
"prisoner's dilemma" effect will prevent "good" employers from agreeing to improved
employment benefits, there is also the possibility that there may be numerous diver-
gent outcomes of a policy initiative, leading to equilibriums at different levels.
Contrary to the canons of neo-classical economics, deregulated labour markets tend
to be associated not with a convergence upon equilibrium but with a disturbing trend
27. S. Deakin, J. Michie, and F. Wilkinson, Inflation, Employment, Wage-bargaining and the Law
(London: Institute of Employment Rights, 1992) 9; Tilly, supra note 26 at 162.
28. David Card and A. Krueger, Myth and Measurement. The New Economics of the Minimum Wage
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1995).
29. Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) 409.
30. Picchio, supra note 8.
31. Irene Breugel and Diane Perrons, "Where Do the Costs of Unequal Treatment for Women Fall?" in
Jane Humphries and Jill Rubery, eds., The Economics of Equal Opportunities (Paris: EOC, 1995)
160.
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toward job and wage polarization. 32 Diane Elson and other economists increasingly
emphasize that "when people have to live from hand to mouth, human energies and
morale are weakened; 'contingent labour' is conducive to 'contingent households'
which fragment and disintegrate, with costs for the people from those households and
for the wider society." 33 If social cohesion and a productive and well-adjusted
population are important policy goals, then it is efficient to have labour market policies
that promote greater equity.34
II. THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT'S LABOUR MARKET POLICY
PERSPECTIVE
Bill 147, the new Employment Standards Act, is the culmination of the Conservative
government's labour standards policy, which the Conservatives characterize as a blend
of flexibility and fairness. Operating from a neo-classical perspective, the government
has defined the terms of flexibility to align primarily with employers' interests.
However, it has made great efforts to emphasize the fairness of the legislation and has
introduced several key measures designed to help employees accommodate the com-
peting pulls of family and paid employment. Fairness is read through a gendered lens,
since women are recognized as bearing the greatest burden of accommodating family
and employment and have been the most vocal group demanding change. The problem
is that the government's broader emphasis on deregulating working time and freezing
the minimum wage undermines the pro-family policies by increasing time pressures
on household members, especially women. Moreover, in combination with rising
hours of work, the leave provisions will likely reinforce the current sexual division of
labour, for it is predominantly women who bear the economic costs of caring for
children.
Despite its commitment to deregulation and the urging of its supporters in business,
the Conservative government did not launch a major onslaught on the Employment
Standards Act, nor dramatically change the core standards. Instead, it injected a bit
more flexibility, first by changing the mechanism of enforcement and, second, by
eroding some select standards. On May 13, 1996, Elizabeth Witmer, then minister of
Labour, introduced the first instalment in the Harris government's policy of labour
market flexibility. The Red Tape Commission, which had been appointed by the
government to locate and eradicate wasteful bureaucracy, claimed that 500 businesses
and institutions it surveyed identified reform of the Employment Standards Act as a
top priority to improve the province's competitive status as a place to invest. Bill 49,
the Act to Improve the Employment Standards Act, according to the press release
accompanying it, represented "the first of a two-phase reform of the Act that will cut
through years of accumulated red tape, encourage the parties to be more self-reliant
32. Jamie Peck, Work-place: The Social Regulation of Labour Market (New York: Guilford Press, 1996)
129.
33. Elson, supra note 25 at 205.
34. Fortin, Sharpe, and St. Hilaire, supra note 25.
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in resolving disputes and make the Act more relevant to the needs of today's work-
place." Although the Minister characterized the bill as making housekeeping amend-
ments, the changes would have restricted access to the enforcement proceedings under
the legislation and introduced flexible standards for unionized workplaces.3 5
The Employment Standards Work Group--a coalition of legal clinics, unions, and
advocates for workers' rights-managed to attract some province-wide attention to
the government's proposed amendments. While it was unable to persuade the govern-
ment to withdraw those elements of Bill 49 that restricted employees' access to the
statutory enforcement proceedings, 3 6 the government withdrew the amendments that
would have permitted unions and employers to negotiate their own employment
standards. Moreover, the campaign against the government's proposals raised the
profile of the legislation and demonstrated that a direct attack on basic employment
standards, even if restricted to the unionized sector, was not popular.
This did not mean that changing employment standards was permanently off the
government's labour policy agenda; it simply meant that the government would
proceed with greater caution. In fact, it held off doing anything about employment
standards until the end of its first mandate, when a consultation document was
disseminated. In the Future of Work discussion paper released in early 1999, the
Ministry of Labour identified some key labour market trends and asked a series of
general questions about employment labour standards and specific questions about
hours of work and balancing family responsibilities. 37 The Employment Standards Act
next featured in the government's re-election document, Blueprint for Change, in
which the government promised to give employers and employees greater flexibility
in designing work arrangements and to provide family-crisis leave.
In late July 2000, the Ministry of Labour released a consultation paper that was the
penultimate stage in the employment standards reform process. 38 "Time for Change"
proclaimed the need to update the Employment Standards Act to meet the challenges
of the twenty-first century:
Ontario needs innovative workplaces that can respond effectively to emerging
opportunities to be competitive and to contribute to a high quality of life. This in
turn will increase productivity, job creation, growth, and investment in Ontario. To
35. The Employment Standards Work Group, The Real Story: An Analysis of the Impact of Bill 49, The
Employment Standards Improvement Act, upon Unorganized Workers, Toronto, July 1996.
36. In addition to reducing the limitation period for bringing a complaint from two years to six months,
Bill 49 restricted the statutory enforcement proceedings to employees who were not covered by
collective agreements and had not brought a civil action on the same subject matter as the employ-
ment standards complaint. These changes, among others, were implemented. The Employment Stan-
dards Improvement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 23.
37. Ontario Ministry of Labour, "The Future of Work in Ontario" (1999) online: Ontario Ministry of
Labour, <http://www.gov.on.ca/LAB/es/fwoe.htm> (date accessed: 1 March 2001).
38. Ontario Ministry of Labour, "ime for Change: Ontario's Employment Standards Legislation" (2000)
online: Ontario Ministry of Labour <http://www.gov.on.ca/LAB/es/Ooespe.htm> (date accessed:
1 March 2001).
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support these objectives, employment standards legislation needs to be flexible,
modem, efficient, and fair.
The document did two basic things: detail the flexible work arrangements and family
crisis leave, and suggest general directions for modernizing the Employment Stan-
dards Act. The flexible hours of work arrangements were the most controversial
aspect. Among the other, less profound, changes to the hours of work provisions, the
government proposed to abolish the permit system for extending hours of work beyond
the 48-hour standard work week, increase the maximum hours of work in a week to
60 hours, and permit the averaging of maximum hours of work limits over four weeks
and entitlement to overtime pay over three weeks. Under the proposed changes, instead
of being required to pay the overtime premium of time-and-a-half for each hour that
the employee worked over 44 in a week, an employer would not be required to pay
any overtime premium until a total of 132 hours in three weeks was worked by an
employee. Thus, an employee who worked 30 hours one week, 60 hours the next, and
42 the third week would not be entitled to overtime pay at time-and-a-half for 16 hours
in the second week. In addition, by allowing the overtime limit to be averaged over
four weeks, employers would gain a huge amount of control over work scheduling.
Workers' schedules could swing wildly between "too little" and "too much," as
employers sought "flexibility" to do just-in-time scheduling. These changes would
create an incentive for employers to pressure workers to work longer, more erratic
hours for less money, by abolishing the role of the government overseer.3 9
The family leave provision was the only aspect of "Time for Change" that offered any
unqualified benefit to employees. Citing the increase in the number of women working
outside of the home, especially those with young children, the increased demands for
care of the elderly or disabled, and the changes in the way that health care is delivered,
the government introduced a 10-day unpaid family leave. According to "Time for
Change," "the goal of the leave provision would be to recognize the various demands
Ontario employees face today and to promote a better work-family balance." The
government interpreted employees' need for flexibility in a highly gendered fashion;
women's responsibilities to provide care for others was clearly the target of the policy.
The government's strategy was to place some mild obligations on employers to
accommodate employees' domestic duties, rather than to challenge employment
norms that exacerbate the conflict between unpaid and paid work. The government's
implicit assumption was that women's unpaid labour would continue to mediate the
tension.
39. While the government could point to provisions in the existing legislation that provided for some
flexibility on overtime and hours of work, its proposal to repeal the permit system meant that there
would no longer be any scrutiny of the flexible arrangements by an independent third party. Instead
of dealing with the criticisms of the permit system by reforming it along the lines suggested by the
Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, Working Times: The Report of the Ontario
Task Force on Hours of Work (Toronto, 1987), the government went in the opposite direction: it
proposed to abolish the permit system and extend the limit on hours of work from 48 to 60 a week.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
In workplaces of 50 employees or more, the government proposed to give all employ-
ees 10 days a year of unpaid, job-protected leave to deal with family crisis, personal
or family illness, and bereavement. However, it refused to make a commitment to
extend job-protected parental leave from 18 to 35 weeks for women and men who
wanted to take advantage of the extended period of employment insurance parental
benefits that was to begin December 31, 2000.40
In addition to these specific proposals, "Time for Change" emphasized the general
need to simplify the language and update the provisions of the Employment Standards
Act. However, the government made it clear that it was not proposing any major
changes to the core standards. Instead, "Time for Change" identified the coverage of,
exemptions from, and the structural, administrative and enforcement features of the
Employment Standards as matters for discussion and possible revision. But with the
exception of the specific recommendations to repeal workplace standards such as the
Employment Agencies Act and the Industrial Standards Act, to increase the monetary.
penalties, and to introduce an anti-reprisal provision, the Ministry was not very
specific about the other types of changes it was contemplating.
In late August 2000, the Minister of Labour presided over public consultations, which
were conducted in five cities. Among the 240 groups and individuals appearing before
the Minister, the usual suspects, holding predictable positions, turned out; workers
advocates, legal clinics, and unions opposed the new flexible hours of work arrange-
ments and called upon the government to extend parental leave, while employers and
their organizations supported the increased flexibility and called for further deregula-
tion. Not surprisingly, given that the consultation hearings were held in the dog days
of summer, they attracted little media or public attention. The public process came to
an end in late September 2000 with the deadline on submitting responses to "Time for
Change."
All was quiet on the employment standards front until the beginning of November
2000, when Premier Harris told reporters that the government had no plans to extend
parental leave, since it had not received any significant pressure from women to
change the legislation. 41 The next day, an N.D.P. member of the provincial legislature,
Shelley Martel, introduced a private member's bill to extend parental leave to 35
weeks. 42 That day, Chris Stockwell softened the government's position; although he
emphasized that it would be an added burden on small business, he said his government
would, before the end of the year, decide whether to give Ontario parents the full-year
job-protected parental leave.43
40. The federal government had earlier announced that it would be amending the Employment Insurance
Act to allow employees up to one year of benefits in order to care for infants, and several provinces
(Quebec, Nova Scotia, and British Columbia) announced that they would extend the length of
job-protected parental leave accordingly.
41. Richard Brennan and Caroline Mallan, "Ontario Won't Extend Parental to Full Year" Toronto Star
(1 November 2000).
42. House of Commons Debates (2 November 2000) (Shelley Martel).
43. Caroline Mallan, "Small Firms Fear Longer Baby Leave" Toronto Star (2 November 2000).
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On November 23, during the National Week of the Child, the Minister of Labour
introduced a completely rewritten Employment Standards Act, a mammoth 105 pages
of new statutory language. With only three weeks remaining in the legislative sitting,
Stockwell claimed it was crucial to pass the bill immediately so that new parents could
have up to 52 weeks of job-protected leave in order to enjoy the extended employ-
ment-insurance benefits that would become available at year end. Not only was there
no time for public hearings on the new bill, according to the Minister, additional
consultation was not necessary.
While the extension of the job-protected leave to coincide with the longer period of
parental benefits was the reason the government gave for moving quickly, it would
have been possible for the government simply to enact the leave provision and to
convene legislative hearings on the more controversial changes to the legislation. The
timing of Bill 147 suggests that the parental and family-leave provisions were used to
sugar coat what was otherwise a bitter pill for most Ontario workers--the changes
relating to working hours. Although the Employment Standards Work Group managed
to attract some public and media attention to that aspect of Bill 147, the government
used its majority to limit legislative review.44 On December 20, a slightly amended
Bill 147 received third reading. 45 While the changes to the length of parental leave
came into effect on January 1, 2001, the rest of Bill 147 was held in abeyance more
than six months before proclamation, belying the Minister's rationale for the need to
move quickly and limit debate on the bill.
III. BILL 147: FLEXIBILITY VERSUS FAIRNESS
Bill 147 is amixed bag of changes: the Employment Standards Act has been completely
rewritten; there are some new provisions, including a requirement that employers post
a notice of basic employment standards in the workplace and a robust anti-reprisal
provision that benefit employees; and a bit more flexibility for employers has been
injected throughout. The extent of the divergence from the old Employment Standards
Act is not yet clear, since the Ministry had not made available any guides to or
descriptions of the new statute. In fact, as late as July 2001 the new regulations were
not available. This is remarkable, since much of the most controversial aspects of
employment standards, especially exclusions, is contained in the regulations. The lack
of key of information makes it difficult to evaluate every feature of the new legislation.
However, there is sufficient detail on limits to maximum weekly hours of work and
entitlement to overtime pay, on the one hand, and the leave provisions, on the other,
to demonstrate that the Conservative government has an understanding of flexibility
that promotes employers' interests, undermines its avowed commitment to fairness,
and reinforces an unequal sexual division of labour.
44. Colin Perkins, "Critics Predict Sweatshops" Globe and Mail (25 November 2000).
45. Richard Mackie, "Contentious Changes to Labour Bill Passed" Toronto Star (21 December 2000).
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Maximum Hours of Work and Overtime Pay
From 1944 through 2000, the law in Ontario provided that an employee could not be
required to work more than 8 hours in a day or 48 hours in a week, unless the employee
agreed to work extra hours and a special permit was issued by the government.46 Bill
147 now repeals the 8-hour workday, allows employees to "agree" to work up to 60
hours in a week, and has (virtually) eliminated the permit system.47
Section 17 of the old Employment Standards Act established the general rule of a
maximum daily hours of work as 8 and a weekly maximum as 48. However, there
were a number of exceptions to these standards. Section 18 provided for an extended
workday, between 8 and 12 hours, if the following conditions were established: there
was Director approval, employee or an employee's agent's agreement, and adherence
to daily (12 hours) and weekly (48 hours) limits. Section 20 entitled the Director to
issue permits authorizing work in excess of the daily or weekly hours of work limits
established in sections 17 and 18. In the case of Director approval (section 18) and
permits (section 20) for extended hours of work, the employee's consent was
required. 48 Regulation 325, clause 2(2) allowed an employee and employer to agree
to averaging two or more weeks when determining whether the weekly hours of work
limit had been met.49 However, the agreement was subject to the Director's approval.
The only time an employer was permitted to exceed the statutory limits on hours of
work without the employee's consent and the Director's approval was that of an
accident or urgent need for work (section 19).
Bill 147 maintains the previous limit of 48 hours in a work week, in section 17(1).
However, section 17(2) now allows an employer and an employee to simply "agree"
that the employee will work up to 60 hours in a week, and the employer is no longer
required to obtain a government permit to have employees exceed the 48-hour limit. In
short, under the new Act, the role of the government overseer has been eliminated-at
least when it comes to allowing employees to "agree" to work up to 60 hours a week.50
46. Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, Working Times: The Report of the Ontario
Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 1987) 24-25.
47. Section 17 of Bill 147 states that no employer shall require an employee to work more than 8 hours
in a day, "or, if the employer establishes a regular work day of more than eight hours for the
employee, the number of hours in his or her regular work day." No limit is then set on the number of
hours that an employer can set for an employee's regular work day. Bill 147 does make 13 hours the
maximum number of hours in day that an employee can be required to work, subject to emergencies
as defined in section 19. Section 18 of Bill 147 establishes this new 13-hour limit indirectly by
providing that an employee is entitled to 11 hours free from work each day (s. 18(1)), but this
entitlement does not apply to an employee who is on call and who is called in to work during a
period when the employee would not otherwise be expected to work (s. 18(2)). Bill 147 (s. 18(3))
also requires that an employee be given at least 8 hours off between shifts unless the total time
worked in successive shifts, does not exceed 13 hours or unless the employee "agrees" to forego the
8 hours off.
48. For a discussion of section 20 permits, see R.M. Parry, A Practical Guide to Employment Standards
in Ontario (Carswell: Toronto, 1996) 28-29. For compelling criticisms of the permit system see the
Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, supra note 46, 27-40.
49. No specific provisions for withdrawing the agreement were provided.
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Under section 1(3) of Bill 147, "agreements," such as those between an employer and
a employee to have the employee work more than 48 hours in a week, must be in
writing. Section 17(3) provides that once an employee agrees to work hours in excess
of 48, the employee has to give two weeks' notice in writing to revoke that agreement.
By virtue of section 17(4) employers may revoke an agreement made under subsection
(2) after giving reasonable notice to the employee. There is no obligation that the
notice be in writing nor any discussion or definition of what constitutes reasonable
notice. Section 141, paragraph 9, specifically authorizes the Cabinet to make a
regulation, despite section 17(3), that would make agreements to exceed 8 hours in a
day irrevocable where the agreements are made at the time of an employee's hiring
and have been approved by the Director of Employment Standards.
Bill 147 has also widened the "exceptional circumstances" in which the mandatory
limits on hours of work in a day or week can be legally ignored by an employer. The
law previously (under the old Employment Standards Act, section 19) allowed employ-
ers to require employees to work longer hours than the legal maximum when, in two
specific circumstances, it was necessary to avoid serious interference with the ordinary
working of the establishment. Those two specific circumstances were: "[i]n case of
an accident or in case of work urgently required to be done to machinery or plant."
Section 19 of Bill 147 replaces those two specific exceptional circumstances with four
more vaguely described circumstances: (1) if there is an emergency; (2) if something
unforeseen occurs, to ensure the continued delivery of essential public services,
regardless of who delivers those services; (3) if something unforeseen occurs, to
ensure that continuous processes or seasonal operations are not interrupted; and (4) if
urgent repair work to the employer's plant or equipment is required.
The new Employment Standards Act also changes the law on entitlement to overtime
pay. From 1975 to 2000, the law in Ontario provided that most employees were entitled
to be paid time-and-a-half of their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of 44
hours in a week. Bill 147 permits an employer and an employee to "agree" that this
entitlement to the time-and-a-half overtime rate will be averaged over a period of up
to four weeks.
By virtue of section 22(1), Bill 147 sets out the general standard for the calculation of
overtime pay-44 hours per week. However, it allows the employee (or the employee's
agent) and employer to agree to average overtime entitlements over a four-week period
(section 22(2)).51 Regulation 325, section 2(2) of the old Employment Standards Act
50. It is also important to note that the 60-hour-per-week limit provided in section 17(2) may be changed
by Cabinet to "such other number of hours as are prescribed" through a regulation. Section 141,
paragraph 8, authorizes the Cabinet to make a regulation that would allow employees to agree to
work more than 60 hours in a week, provided that conditions in such a regulation are met and "those
conditions could include having the approval of the Director [of Employment Standards]." This suggests
that a regulation may be passed to require permits for work weeks that exceed 60 hours.
51. Bill 147, section 141, paragraph 7, specifically authorizes Cabinet to make a regulation that would
permit an employer and an employee to "agree" to average the employee's hours of work over a
period of more than four weeks for the purposes of determining the employee's entitlement to
overtime. However, it also provides that the conditions set out in the regulations, including the
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also allowed employees and employers to agree to average overtime pay entitlements
over several weeks. However, the Director's approval was required. 52 In contrast,
under Bill 147 averaging agreements, while they must be in writing (section 1(3)), do
not need to be approved by the Director. Section 22(3) stipulates that an averaging
agreement must be for a specified period and, if the employee is not represented by a
union, the period cannot be for longer than two years from the date of the agreement,
although the agreement can be renewed (section 23(4)). Section 22(6) states that an
averaging agreement may not be revoked before it expires, unless both the employee
and the employer agree.
Under Bill 147, if an employee agrees to have overtime entitlement averaged over four
weeks and to work up to 60 hours in a week, it is possible that the employee could
work 60 hours in a week and not be entitled to any overtime pay. Indeed, in the worst
case scenario, this employee could work 60 hours in week one, 60 hours in week two,
56 hours in week three and 0 hours in week four and not be entitled to any overtime
pay because the employee did not work more than 176 hours over the four-week
period. Under the law as it existed from 1975 to 2000, this same employee would have
received time-and-a-half for 16 hours in week one, 16 hours in week two, and 12 hours
in week three.
Under the old law, unless an employer obtained a permit, employees could only be
asked to work 48 hours in a week. While there were many well-documented problems
with the permit system for extended hours of work, the government's solution simply
to abolish it shifts onto the employee the burden of objecting to long hours of work.
Bill 147 lets employers ask workers to work up to 60 hours a week. Employees can
refuse to work more than 48, but that presumes a balance of power between employer
and employee that simply does not exist in most workplaces. While only the most
precarious are likely to be dismissed if they refuse to work long hours, promotions
and favourable treatment often depend upon an employee's willingness to do what the
employer asks.
There will be a real incentive with "averaging" for employers to schedule short weeks,
say 20 hours, during slower periods, followed by really long weeks when business is
busier. While the government says there is a caveat--the employee would have to
agree to this arrangement-one has to ask, "Why would any workers ever agree to
average overtime, since they will be paid less for working the same number of hours?"
One answer is that there are many vulnerable workers who will not be able to say no
without fear of repercussions. In fact, this is one of the reasons the government gave
for adding an anti-reprisal provision and hiring 20 new employment standards offi-
cers.
53
Director's approval, be met.
52. For a detailed discussion of the conditions for approving averaging hours under the old Employment
Standards Act, see R.M. Parry, supra note 48 at 51.
53. Bill 147 now provides a general anti-reprisal section, which the Employment Standards Working
Group has long been asking for. Section 74(1) prohibits employers from intimidating, dismissing, or
otherwise penalizing an employee (or threatening to do so) because the employee asks the employer
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The Ontario government's policy on working hours flexibility runs contrary to the
direction taken in other provinces in Canada and in some countries in Europe. Quebec,
for example, moved to a 40-hour work week in 2000. Almost half the workers in
Canada have a 40-hour week. In contrast, overtime pay in Ontario is available after
44 hours, and the maximum weekly hours of work is 48. The increased flexibility that
Bill 147 injects into the standards means that long hours are likely to increase. In
Europe, many countries are heading toward a 35-hour work week. The most innovative
experiment is that adopted by France in 1998, which passed two laws on 35 hours of
work per week. As of January 1, 2000, the 35-hour work week became the legal
standard in France; companies reducing hours and hiring more workers are given
financial incentives in the form of lower payroll taxes. 54
Moreover, two important bipartisan studies of hours of work, the first appointed by
the Ontario government in the mid-1980s and the second appointed by the federal
government in the early 1990s, recommended that the standard work week be reduced
to 40 hours and that overtime be limited. In 1987, the Ontario Task Force on Hours of
Work and Overtime recommended that an employer could ask each employee to work
a total of 250 hours a year over the 40 hours per week and that for hours of work in
excess of that amount a revised permit system be retained. 55 In its 1994 report, the
federally appointed Advisory Group on Working Time and the Distribution of Work
suggested that overtime be reduced to 100 hours per year.56 It emphasized the
importance of the government's role in ensuring the balance between the contradictory
pulls of employers' and employees' interests in flexibility. Increasing stress that results
from the struggle to balance work and family time, together with the unequal distri-
bution of work and work time, were major reasons for the recommendation to reduce
hours of work.
The Conservative government in Ontario has moved in the opposite direction. Instead
of decreasing the standard work week, Bill 147 introduces flexibility in a form that
to comply with the Employment Standards Act makes inquiries about, Employment Standards Act
rights, or is or will become eligible for a leave. Section 74(2) places the burden of proof on the
employer to establish that it did not violate section 72(1). The only exception to the reverse onus in
section 74(2) regarding section74(l) is on the review of a notice of contravention under section 113.
In this situation, sectionl22(4) states that the onus of proof is on the Director, who must establish
that the person against whom the notice of contravention is issued contravened the Act. In addition,
the employment standards officers' powers regarding reprisals have been substantially strengthened.
Section 104(1) of Bill 147 provides that if an employment standards officer finds that an employer
has violated Part XVII (section 74 reprisal), the officer may reinstate as well as compensate the
employee. The reinstatement powers of employment standards. officers have been considerably
expanded.
54. In Germany and the Netherlands, where they have been significant reductions in weekly hours of
work, negotiation, rather than legislation, has been the preferred mechanism for reducing the work
week. Anders Hayden, Sharing the Work, Sparing the Planet: Work Time, Consumption, and Ecol-
ogy (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1999).
55. Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, supra note 46.
56. Advisory Group on Working Time and Distribution of Work, Report of the Advisory Group on
Working Time and Distribution of Work (Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1994).
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will likely make the work week longer and more erratic. Stagnant and declining real
wages increase the pressure on individuals to work longer hours and for more members
of a household to work in order to maintain living standards. Bill 147 will likely
exacerbate the growing polarization around hours of work and time stress. Increased
inequality in work time and income, combined with less time for individual fulfilment
and caring for family members, will likely have negative consequences for individu-
als, households, and society in general. These costs need to be accounted for when
tallying the benefits that the government predicts will result from increasing flexibility
for employers.
Parental and Family Emergency Leaves
Bill 147 provides job-protected leaves in three circumstances: absences due to preg-
nancy, the care of children new to a household, and emergencies, which include family
emergencies and personal illness. The pregnancy and parental leave provisions have
been revised to dovetail with the maternity and parental benefits provided under the
Employment Insurance Act, and the emergency leave is new. The leave provisions in
Bill 147 are the clearest example of the government's avowed intention to increase
flexibility for employees and promote greater fairness.
Bill 147 makes two major changes to the old maternity and parental leave provisions.
The first benefits employees by extending the length of parental leave from 18 to 35
weeks, and the second benefits employers by giving them greater flexibility to
terminate employees returning from maternity and parental leave. Under the old
Employment Standards Act, employers were required to reinstate an employee at the
conclusion of the employee's leave to the position that the employee most recently
held with the employer, if it still existed, or to a comparable position if it did not. Bill
147 qualifies the employee's right to reinstatement: section 53(2) states that the right
to reinstatement in section 53(1) does not apply if the employment is ended solely for
reasons unrelated to the leave. Moreover, Bill 147 does not contain the protection in
the former Employment Standards Act, section 43(2), which provided that an employee
whose employer had suspended or discontinued operations during the employee's
leave had rights to reinstatement (in accordance with the seniority system or practice)
when the operations resumed. While the jurisprudence on an employee's right to
reinstatement after the conclusion of a statutory leave was inconsistent (ranging from
an absolute right to reinstatement, to a rebuttable presumption, to bona fide termina-
tion exemption), the plain language of the old Employment Standards Act section 43(2)
supported an interpretation that the right to reinstatement was absolute. 57 The protec-
tion in Bill 147 has been watered down. This means that an employer could argue that
an employee on leave has been terminated for economic reasons or cause. While the
new anti-reprisal provision section 74(2) places the onus of proof on the employer,
57. See, for example, the following inconsistent cases: Re American Can Canada, August 18, 1993
(Picher), Employment Standards Cases 1464; Re Innes Dental Health Group, July 26, 1993 (Muir)
ES 93-145; Re Nygard International, October 12, 1994 (Muir) E.S.C. 3432; Re Ontario Blue Cross,
August 18, 1995 (Muir) E.S.C. 3413 A.
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who must establish that it did not contravene the Act, the absolute right to reinstate-
ment is a more robust protection for employees.
Bill 147 also provides an entirely new "emergency leave" entitlement. Under section
50(1) an employee whose employer regularly employs 50 or more employees is now
entitled to 10 days' leave without pay due to a personal illness, injury or medical injury,
the death or illness, injury, or medical emergency of an individual described in section
50(2) (a broadly defined family member), and an urgent matter that concerns an
individual described in section 50(2).58 Emergency leave is an extremely important
provision, because it recognizes that employees should not be penalized for missing
employment on account of unavoidable circumstances, such as personal illness or
caring for a family member. What the leave provision does is provide employees with
some recourse if an employer dismisses them or takes any form of reprisal against
them for missing work for these reasons.
But this entitlement is very limited; only employees who work in workplaces with 50
employees or more are entitled to take emergency leave. This means that a growing
portion of the workforce will be excluded. While large workplaces continue to be the
largest source of employment in Canada, since the late 1970s small businesses have
been the key contributors to net job creation. 59 Moreover, in the early 1990s, Julie
White found that there is a significant difference in the proportion of men and women
in the smallest finms-those with fewer than 20 employees. Almost 31 per cent of all
female workers are employed in these firms, in contrast to 25 per cent of male
workers.60 Thus, the emergency-leave provision is least likely to be available to those
workers who need it most: female workers in small firms who do not have the benefit
of a collective agreement. While the government has justified the 50-employee
requirement as necessary to protect small business, it is unlikely that many small
businesses would be made uncompetitive simply because they were not allowed to
fire employees who took off a few days for personal illness or a family emergency.
Even when explicitly promoting employees' interest in flexibility and fostering a
family agenda, the Conservative government places the interest of small business first.
The extension of job-protected parental leave and the introduction of emergency leave
are good for employees. They increase employees' ability balance the demands of
work and family. However, they do not go far enough. While extended parental leave,
58. Note that, unlike pregnancy and parental leaves, which require 13 weeks of service as a condition of
entitlement, there is no minimum service requirement. The only requirement is that the employee's
employer "regularly employs 50 or more employees" (section 50(1)).
59. According to one measure, between 1978 and 1992, companies with fewer than 20 employees had
what amounted to an 8 per cent gain in employment, while companies with more than 500 employ-
ees shed jobs for a net loss of 1.2 per cent per year. John Manley (Minister of Industry) and Paul
Martin (Minister of Finance), Growing Small Business (Ottawa: Industry, 1994) 3; G. Picot, J.
Baldwin, and R. Dupuy, Have Small Firms Created a Disproportionate Share of New Jobs in
Canada? A Reassessment of the Facts, Analytic Studies Branch, Research Paper Series, #71 (Statis-
tics Canada: Ottawa, November 1994).
60. Julie White, Sisters and Solidarity: Women and Unions in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational
Press, 1993) 192.
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especially when combined with parental benefits, helps to ease the competing demands
of work and family when the contradiction is most profound-when there is an infant
to care for-it does little to challenge the unequal sexual division of labour. In fact,
because of the way maternity and parental unemployment insurance benefits are
structured (with a cap on the maximum amount of insurable earnings and benefits
pegged at only 55 per cent of average weekly earnings), there is an incentive for the
lower-income earner in a dual-earner household, typically the woman, to take parental
leave.61 And while women are more likely to benefit from the emergency-leave
provision than are men, the fact that the leave does not extend to small workplaces
means that women are disproportionately excluded.62
Moreover, it is obvious that increasing the flexibility that employers have when asking
employees to work longer hours will increase the stress that women already experience
in finding the time to balance the demands of work and family. In order to compensate
for declining wages, it is likely that men and women will continue to work longer
hours. This, in turn, will likely stretch household coping capacities even further and
exacerbate the already unequal division of paid and unpaid labour between men and
women.
CONCLUSION
Bill 147, the new Employment Standards Act, is a clear illustration of the Ontario
Conservative government's neo-classical labour market policy agenda. The govern-
ment justified its changes to the Employment Standards Act by asserting Ontario's
need to be more competitive in order to improve the quality of life for people in
Ontario. For the most part, flexibility is equated with deregulation, and employers
benefit from it. The recent changes to hours of work standards give employers the
flexibility to ask employees to work longer hours for less money. Some employees
will be willing to work longer hours, in part to compensate for stagnant and declining
real wages. A few employees may want to compress their work week in order to
accommodate other commitments. And others will feel pressured to accommodate
employer requests. The likely impact of this change to employment standards is to
reinforce deleterious trends in the labour market. More people will work long hours
that are injuring their health. The struggle to juggle family responsibilities will get
harder, and combined with a growth in part-time jobs, longer hours for some will
contribute to deepening polarization in the labour market.
The United States has the longest experience with neo-liberal labour market policies.
Deregulation there has been touted as very efficient, since it has been seen as
61. Patricia Evans and Noreen Pupo, "Parental Leave: Assessing Women's Interests" (1993), 6 C.J.W.L.
402; Nitya Iyer, "Some Mothers Are Better than Others: A Re-examination of Maternity Benefits" in
S. Boyd, ed., "Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview" in Susan Boyd, ed., Challeng-
ing the Public/Private Divide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 168.
62. Overall, in 1999 paid female employees missed an average of seven days due to personal illness or
family commitments, while employed men missed only one day. Statistics Canada, Women in
Canada, supra note 15 at 103.
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contributing to their low levels of unemployment relative to Western Europe. How-
ever, recently, greater attention is being paid to the quality of the jobs that the
deregulated labour market has generated and to the deepening levels of poverty in the
U.S. Much of the employment generated in that country since the 1980s has been in
the low-wage service sector-McJobs are the classic illustration of this type of
employment. The problem is that thesejobs do not generate enough income or security
for employees to have enough flexibility either to improve their skills or adapt to their
family needs. 63 There is also increasing evidence that labour-market policies that
promote low-paying firms and sectors do not improve competitiveness in the longer
term. Since low-paying firms and sectors are typically employers of the last resort,
they have high levels of labour turnover, particularly when unemployment is low.
According to Kitson, Martin, and Wilkinson, "[T]his excessive churning means that
it is not possible to build up the long-term relations to develop co-operative work
organization and a highly trained, multi-skilled, functionally flexible workforce nec-
essary for the good design, high quality, and product and process innovation upon
which competitive performance increasingly depends." 64 Moreover, in as unlikely a
place as one would expect, a headline in the business pages of the Globe and Mail
recently proclaimed, "U.S. in the 1990s: Land of the Unequal, Home of the Poor.' '65
The levels of pay inequality in the U.S. are the highest of the rich nations; so, too, are
its rates of poverty. This suggests that while neo-classical labour-market deregulation
policies may create more low-wage and insecure jobs, this may not be efficient in the
mid or longer term. Such deregulation has not led to greater productivity gains in the
U.S. relative to its major competitors. 66 Moreover, large degrees of inequality under-
mine social cohesion, stretch social norms, and erode the capacities of families to
socialize children. Evidence suggests that neo-classical labour market policies are
inequitable and inefficient.
The policy of increasing hours of work is not popular in most households in Canada.
A recent issue of Maclean's that featured "redesigning work" on the cover, emphasized
growing unhappiness with employment stress and an increased recognition of the
social costs of working long hours as reasons for developing new employment
policies.67 The story also identified employed mothers of young children as the key
instigators of the challenge to the structure and culture of employment. Stress at work
and, especially for women, in balancing family and work, is recognized as a growing
social problem.
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When Bill 147 was introduced, the government emphasized the family-friendly
changes it was making and downplayed the extent of the changes it was making to the
hours-of-work provisions. The public policy debate was very narrow. That debate
needs to be reopened, and its terms need to be expanded. Adaptability to economic
change by employers and employees does not have to translate into reducing per-unit
labour costs. It is possible to devise employment standards that enable the parties to
negotiate a range of employment relations but that prevent the employer from shifting
the risks of flexibility onto employees in particular, and society in general. Employ-
ment standards could also promote greater equality for men and women if they began
from the assumption that every working person needs both to be self-sufficient and to
care for others.68 It is a fallacy to assume that promoting fairness in the labour market
reduces efficiency. By refusing to question its assumptions, neo-classical economic
common sense operates as a pro-business ideology. Sadly, it also results in bad public
policy.
68. For a discussion of these sorts of policies see Fudge and Vosko, supra note 14; and Spalter-Roth and
Hartnann, supra note 14.
